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Letter from the
Executive Director
It is my pleasure to introduce The Caribbean
Papers, a product of our major research project on
Caribbean Economic Governance. CIGI is an inde-
pendent, nonpartisan think tank that addresses
international governance challenges. Led by a
group of experienced practitioners and distin-
guished academics, CIGI supports research,
forms networks, advances policy debates, builds
capacity, and generates ideas for multilateral
governance improvements.
This project convenes researchers and leaders
within the private and public sectors to examine
and provide substantive answers and policy pre-
scriptions to current economic governance chal-
lenges facing the Caribbean region. The papers
were initially presented at CIGI workshops, where
their authors benefited from extensive comments
and discussion on their work. Through this series,
we hope to present and discuss policy issues 
pertaining to trade, investment, human capital,
the fiscal outlook, and public sector management
practices, among other issues relevant to the
Caribbean region’s economic future.
We encourage your commentary on these papers
and welcome your thoughts. Please visit us online
at www.cigionline.org to learn more about the
Caribbean Economic Governance Project and
CIGI’s research program. 
Thank you,
John English
Executive Director
Abstract
Dialogue on diasporas and their role in the development
of the home country has grown in the last twenty years
and Caribbean states have begun to identify ways they can
engage their nationals residing abroad in this process.
Those in the region looking to harness the power of the
diaspora have turned their attention to the example of
Ireland, a country with a large diaspora that has contributed
significantly to its national advancement. By highlighting
the lessons of the Irish experience, this paper argues that
while the Caribbean’s diaspora has the desire to contribute
and does help through remittances, there remain a number
of challenges to this participation including perceptions
of security and stability, establishing the conditions nec-
essary for attracting investment and a lack of confidence
in government institutions in the region.
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Introduction
The past two decades have seen significant growth in the
body of work on population movements generally referred
to as diasporas. Interestingly, the progression of research
across disciplines indicates not only the growing relevance
of the area in and of itself, but perhaps even more signif-
icantly, a recognition of both the real and potential effects
a diaspora can have on both the home and host countries. 
In recent decades, such population movements have be-
come more fluid, with greater opportunities to maintain
links and increased interaction between home and host
country (Meyer, 2003). This has meant a growth in the
population of diaspora communities worldwide, which
the United Nations estimated at the start of the twenty-
first century to be 175 million. However, home countries
have yet to access fully what remains a largely untapped
source of economic development (Lowell and Gerova,
2004). In part, this realization accounts for the move of
diaspora studies in more recent years from a preoccupation
with the “softer” disciplines of sociology and anthropology
to an area of interest for economists, political scientists,
and practitioners.
One advantage of diaspora communities is that they can
stand outside any system (whether in the home or the
host country) and assess how to use the baggage they
carry to the benefit of the home country, particularly with
respect to systemic change. As Lowell and Gerova (2004)
note, however, the nature of the benefits that accrue to the
home country is inconclusive; as such, there remains
room for more in-depth research on the actual effect of
diaspora populations and returning migrants on their
home country. The need for such research is becoming
even more evident as academia’s increasing focus on
diasporas is now being reflected within international
institutions of aid and advice, including the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), which has identified
the “diaspora option” – the mobilization of the skills and
resources of diaspora communities – as an attractive
developmental tool for home countries (see Meyer, 2003).
In turn, the role of diasporas is increasingly reflected in
home governments’ policy agendas. 
Among the countries that have received particular cover-
age as it relates to diasporas and development is Ireland.1
The Irish diaspora in countries such as the United States
is notable for the role it has played in helping Ireland to
realize the phenomenal growth and development wit-
nessed up to recently.2 Indeed, the Irish experience has
significant implications for the role that other diaspora
communities, particularly from developing countries,
could play in national development. This is the case for
the islands of the Caribbean, which, like Ireland, are
marked by a history of migration that has resulted in the
creation of a large diaspora. Additionally, like Ireland, the
economies of the Caribbean are for the most part small,
with a historic dependence on the United Kingdom as
their main trading partner. Caribbean islands such as
Jamaica are now directing their attention to the Irish
example in order to assess the lessons of this experience
for their own economic development.
This paper explores a number of themes that have been
developing in diaspora studies and applies these to the
Caribbean and Ireland. The conclusion that emerges is that,
although the Irish experience offers important lessons
and despite the many similarities between the Irish 
and Caribbean cases, Caribbean countries manifest many
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1 See for instance, Lloyd (1999); Bielenberg (2000); Fanning (2000); Finnegan and
McCarron (2000); Kenny (2003); Arora and Gambardell (2004); and Cleary and
Connally (2005).
2 In 1987, Ireland was experiencing high government debt (112 percent of gross
domestic product, GDP), high unemployment (17 percent) and large-scale emi-
gration. By 2003 debt had declined to 33 percent of GDP, and by 2006 unemploy-
ment had declined to 4.3 percent. Between 1999 and 2004, Ireland’s GDP grew at
an annual average rate of 6.93 percent, surpassing all other member countries of
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for the same
period. See Burnham (2003); “The Irish Economy,” The Economist. October 14,
2004; Ireland (2005); and “Migrants drive workforce past the 2 million mark,” The
Irish Times. September 14, 2006.
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unique aspects that suggest caution in attempting to
transpose Irish developments to that region. Moreover,
the role of the diaspora in Ireland’s development cannot
be divorced from the specific macroeconomic initiatives
undertaken by the Irish government that paved the way
for the involvement of foreign investors and, in so doing,
attracted the attention and wealth of its diaspora. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
an overview of some of the more salient diaspora issues
and discusses the major themes that will inform the
remainder of the work. This is followed by a focus on the
cases of Ireland and the Caribbean, highlighting some of
the conditions that led to the creation of diasporas from
these countries and the role these groups have played in
the development of their home countries. Finally, the
heart of the paper assesses the lessons that the Caribbean
can learn from the Irish experience, and closes with a 
conclusion and a set of recommendations for Caribbean
countries concerning the role their diaporas can play in
the region’s development.
An Overview of the Diaspora Issue
The term “diaspora” has its beginnings in the Greek word
diaspeirien (to sow or scatter seeds), and was originally
used to refer to Jews who were scattered beyond Israel.
Its use has now been extended to cover people generally
who have moved from their homelands to dwell in
another country. Chander (2001), for instance, defines a
diaspora as “that part of a people, dispersed in one or
more countries other than its homeland, that maintains a
feeling of transnational community among a people and
its homeland” (1020).3 What remains unclear from this
definition is the extent to which a group has to “maintain”
this feeling of community in order to be part of a diaspora.
Furthermore, while early definitions focused mainly on
ethnic diasporas, later definitions have paved the way for
categorization based on purpose and community, such as
professional, entrepreneurial, intellectual and scientific
diasporas (see Esman, 2006; Séguin, Singer and Daar,
2006). The difficulty in defining a diaspora is something
that governments also face when deciding who is entitled
to citizenship – for example, with which generation should
the right of citizenship and nationality end? Traditionally,
research in the area was undertaken within a sociological
and anthropological context, but it now increasingly spans
a number of disciplines and intellectual traditions, includ-
ing economics and politics.4 Indeed, the growing emphasis
on diaspora studies is itself indicative of the increasing
relevance, size and activities of diaspora communities.
Brain Drain
The diaspora literature has dwelt at length on the reasons
for both voluntary and involuntary migration. These fit
into what are termed push or supply factors and pull or
demand factors for emigration (see Adams and Page, 2003;
Coppel, Dumont and Visco, 2003). Push factors relate to
conditions in the home country that make emigration an
attractive alternative, such as unemployment or political
dislocations. Pull factors relate to conditions in the host
country that attract migrants, such as opportunities for a
higher standard of living or better education.
Adams and Page (2003) note a tendency among individuals
in middle-income countries to migrate, as they are more
able to afford the costs of travel.5 Globalization has also
opened up routes for greater movement of skills and
labour, leading to the growth of diaspora communities
globally (see Meyer, 2003). Indeed, one of the more con-
tentious and deeply challenging views in the literature is
the impact of the loss of educated and highly skilled
immigrants on the home country. This movement, or
“brain drain,” often takes place from a developing country
to a developed country.
Brain drain traditionally was seen as having a singularly
negative effect on the supply country, leading to deficien-
cies in human capital. More recent expositions, however,
have sought to reassess this view (see, for example, Stark,
Helmenstein and Prskawetz, 1997; Stark, 2004), suggesting
that diasporas or migrant communities can have a positive
effect on their home countries. Here, the emphasis is on the
gains that accrue to home countries from the movement
of their nationals (brains) across the globe. The emergence
of notions such as the “diaspora option” envisions a rela-
tionship between the home and host country that is more
mutually beneficial (Meyer, 2003).6 Indeed, migration of
the highly educated is now recognized as a potential
incentive to increase investment in, and thus raise the
overall level of, education in home countries.7 Moreover, 
2 | Indianna D. Minto
3 Sheffer (1996) has a more extensive discussion of “diaspora” and the definitional,
theoretical and conceptual shifts the term has experienced over the years.
4 See, for instance, Saxenian (1999, 2002, 2003); Beine, Docquier and Rapoport
(2001); Faini (2003); Sheffer (2003); and Esman (2006).
5 This point, coupled with proximity to the United States and Canada, might help
to explain the high proportion of Caribbean nationals who migrate from the region.
6 Phrases such as “brain circulation” and “brain exchange” have also been used
to embody the recasting of views on diaspora movements; see Kuznetsov and
Sabel (2006).
programs for attracting highly skilled migrants, which
countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and
Canada have used, offer incentives for individuals in the
home country to seek higher education and training as a
means of economic mobility through migration. As well,
the economic development role played by migrants who
return to their home country and the transfer of knowl-
edge from host to home country have also contributed to
a rethink of the brain drain thesis (see Saxenian, 2001;
Meyer, 2003).
Faini (2003) argues, however, that developed world immi-
gration policies might hinder development prospects in
developing countries, noting that, even where aggregate
migration data are used to support the brain gain thesis,
this “cannot be used to find out whether skilled migration
fosters education” (11). Carrington and Detragiache (1998)
note that investments in education ultimately do not
translate into higher economic growth in cases where a
large percentage of the highly skilled migrates. In such
cases, incentives could be provided to entice would-be
migrants to stay in the home country or receiving countries
could help the home country recoup the costs of educating
individuals who then migrate.8 These authors also find
that the majority of migrants to the United States from
developing countries such as the Philippines, China and
regions of Latin America and the Caribbean are among
the most highly educated in their home countries, while
Lowell and Gerova (2004) find that one in ten tertiary-
educated adults in Australia, North America and western
Europe was born in a developing country.
Although such studies give an idea of the magnitude of
the shift of skilled and educated workers from developing
to developed countries, it is still difficult to determine the
precise effect these losses have had on the developing world. 
The Contributions of Diaspora Networks
Diasporas can help their home countries through the
application of the skills, ties and wealth they have collected
abroad. The development of diaspora networks, expatriate
knowledge networks, and scientific communities (such
as the Polish Scientists Abroad Network) that transcend
national borders allow diasporas to link their home
country into a global network through which ideas and
innovations can be accessed and transferred.9 Indeed, the
creation of such networks or communities is closely
linked to the notions of brain circulation or brain exchange
introduced above. Such a role remains vital for countries
aiming to enhance their prospects through the use of 
science and technology (see Nelson, 2005). As Kuznetsov
and Sabel (2006) observe, however, achieving this balance
requires a degree of ingenuity, creativity and patience. 
At another level, hometown associations (HTAs) – associa-
tions of migrants originating from the same community
or town in the home country – can help the development
of infrastructure and services within their home commu-
nities. Such associations, which are very active within 
the Mexican and Salvadoran expatriate communities, for
example, use “collective remittancing” to provide funds
for education and health facilities in their home countries
(see Martin, 2001; Lapointe, 2004; Lowell and Gervoa,
2004). Martin (2001) notes that these groups are being
encouraged to invest in small businesses and manufactur-
ing to create local jobs in Latin America.
Transnational networks and HTAs also perform a social
role in home countries, not just through donations and
remittances but through the function of migration itself.
That is, migration arguably allows states to transfer pop-
ulation growth, hence reducing claims on scarce resources
and the provision of public goods and services. In so doing,
it helps to reduce the strain on governments, lessening
the effect of underdevelopment by providing an alternative
means of empowerment and advancement. Diasporas thus
can play a significant role in poverty and social relief
since their departure arguably allows individuals in the
home country to access goods and services. This social role
is also visible in the humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief provided by diasporas in times of crisis.10
Financial Contributions
As I alluded to above, diasporas also have a more direct
impact on the economic development of the home country
through such financial instruments as remittances.
Indeed, Pastor (1985: 19) says that remittances are “the
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7 See, for example, Bhagwati (1976); Mountford (1997); Stark, Helmenstein and
Prskawetz (1998); Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001).
8 Indeed, such an obligation may become more urgent as developed countries
such as Australia, the United States and Canada introduce regulations that, in
effect, skim the cream of the most talented individuals from the developing world
(see Séguin, Singer and Daar, 2006).
9 See, for example, Meyer and Brown (1999); Saxenian (2001); Kutznetsov and
Sabel (2006); and Séguin, Singer and Daar (2006). In examining the existence of
expatriate knowledge networks in the 1990s, Meyer and Brown (1999) found 41
such groups linked across 30 different countries. Differences may be based on size,
membership, activities, involvement and level of independence from the state.
10 Freinkman (2001) notes, however, that, in the case of the Armenian diaspora,
the focus on fulfilling humanitarian needs has prevented it from making a more
significant contribution to their home country’s economic development. Esman
(2006) also argues that the poor investment climate in Armenia has hampered its
diaspora from making a greater economic contribution.
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most compelling positive effect of migration.” Estimates
from organizations such as the World Bank and the
United Nations confirm that the level of remittances is
significant, amounting to US$80 billion in 2002, notably
more than the amount of registered aid to developing
countries. Remittances also have a multiplier effect in
encouraging growth among the businesses where these
funds are spent (see Martin, 2001). Faini (2003) gives the
example of Turkey, where remittances in the 1990s
accounted for around 2 percent of GDP, reducing the
overall effect of migration from that country. 
Nonetheless, the full impact of remittances on developing
countries remains unclear, given the difficulty in account-
ing for all transfers of cash through private or unofficial
hands. Additionally, Faini (2003) observes that remittance
levels decline with income per capita in the host country
and are lower among highly skilled migrants. And,
although Adams and Page (2003) maintain that an average
10 percent rise in global remittances could reduce poverty
rates in developing countries by 1.6 percent, most small
developing countries do not have diasporas of sufficient
size to obtain such a significant increase in remittances.
Ghosh (2006) argues that remitted funds are spent more
on consumption than on investment, and place pressure on
the home country’s import bill. As he notes, remittances
represent a contribution to household budgets and, as
such, are not capital flows (57-65). 
The cost of sending remittances also affects the amount
that is remitted, with high costs fostering the use of more
informal and private channels for sending money, which
reduces the income (taxes and fees) that governments
earn from such funds. Arguably, reducing transaction
costs could raise the level of funds remitted and encourage
the use of banking institutions, although the example of
HTAs and joint remittancing discussed earlier suggests
ways in which this financial contribution could be
rationalized or made more effective in the home country
or community.
Foreign currency accounts and bonds represent other
ways in which diasporas can contribute to the economies
of their home countries, as evidenced by the examples of
China, India, Brazil and Israel. As Lowell and Gervoa
(2004) point out, however, the usefulness of this instrument
might be limited to large countries with a sizable diaspora
– a point with particular significance for small countries
such as those of the Caribbean unless investment issues
are tackled on a regional basis. 
Crucially, diaspora involvement in the home economy also
extends to the area of trade and investments (see Johnson
and Sedaca, 2006). A joint report from the Inter-American
Dialogue and the World Bank (2004) notes the impact
that trade in “nostalgic” and “ethnic” goods could have
on a nation’s exports and the development of the small
business sector (although small businesses still have to
struggle against obstacles to their ability to access credit,
as well as high taxation and trade restrictions). Allegiance
to the home country can place its diaspora in a position
to act as a ready market for exports and as first movers in
making investments in the home country and, in so
doing, signal to others the potential for investment in that
economy (Lowell and Gervoa, 2004). The savings and
knowledge diaspora communities acquire abroad also
equips them with the skills and resources to make viable
investments at home.
Returning Migrants and Development
While local instability may encourage emigration, the
pattern may be reversed if conditions improve in the
home country – for example, if opportunities improve for
promotion and social mobility or if political and economic
stability are achieved. In such cases, the return of members
of the diaspora can be felt through the use of the skills
and knowledge they acquired abroad. India, China and
Taiwan stand out as examples of the impact that returning
migrants can have on development in the home country.11
Moreover, return does not have to be permanent in order
to be positive for the home country, which suggests that
there is also potential for sustained innovation and
knowledge transfer as the diaspora shifts back and forth
between home and host country.12 However, not all
returning members of a diaspora make a positive contribu-
tion to the home country – failed migrants13 and deportees
are among those whose return may have little impact on
the home country’s development.14
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11 See Solimano (2001); Saxenian (2001, 2003). For example, 94 companies located
in Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science Park in its first eight years of existence (1980-1988),
but this number rose to 284 by 1999, 110 of which were established by engineers 
educated in the United States (Saxenian, 2003). Figures from the US Education
Association show that, of the 160,000 Chinese students that left for the United
States between 1978 and 1998, 30,000 returned to China.
12 Solimano (2001) reports that most Indians are not interested in returning home
permanently – whereas 1,500 highly qualified Indians in the United States returned
home in 2000, 30 times this number emigrate each year. Thus, as Saxenian (2003)
notes, Indians have been able to create links between their country and others
through success in places such as Silicon Valley.
13 Duleep (1994) refers to failed migrants as “mistaken migrants” because their
skills cannot benefit the home country.
14 Indeed, such groups may even be detrimental to the development prospects of
the home country when scarce resources are spent on these individuals or when
deportees get involved in criminal activities at home. These areas of diaspora
research merit more focused analysis.
Factors Affecting the Diaspora’s Contribution 
to the Home Country
The need to attract the attention and contribution of a
diaspora extends beyond a focus on remittances. As noted
above, conditions in both the home and host country may
act as incentives (push or pull factors) for migration. Sim-
ilarly, the diaspora’s return or willingness to contribute to
the home country’s development may also be influenced
by the incentives or initiatives aimed at attracting its
members, and by the rules and regulations of the host
country – for example, schemes to assist entrepreneurs
within the diaspora to engage in business activities in the
home country.
A related and perhaps even more crucial factor concerns
the diaspora’s capacity and desire to make a contribution
to its home country. Thus, two of Esman’s (2006) three key
determinants of the level of contribution that a diaspora
makes to economic development relate specifically to the
diaspora itself. First, the diaspora must have the capacity
to make the level of contribution needed to have an impact
and, second, it must also have the inclination or desire to
make such a contribution. 
However, a consideration of the diaspora’s impact on
development is as much about the home country as it is
about the diaspora itself. Even more, the home country
has an even stronger incentive than the host country in
ensuring that an environment is fostered that allows for
the diaspora’s involvement in the local economy and
society. Thus, Esman’s third condition is the nature of 
the economic climate in the home country. For instance,
Saxenian (2001) notes that, for engineers, return depends
on their ability to match or improve on opportunities
available in the host country. This may also be the case for
other individuals, whether skilled or unskilled. Since a
lack of opportunity at home may have encouraged 
emigration in the first instance, it stands to reason that
growth and development in the home country may also
encourage return.
Even in the absence of such growth, however, governments
can introduce schemes to entice the diaspora to return.
Sometimes, such gestures are symbolic: India for instance,
has introduced dual citizenship and an annual conference
for people of Indian origin (Séguin, Singer and Daar, 2006),
while Nigeria has an annual Diaspora Day in honour of
this group (Obasanjo, 2005). Nonetheless, measures aimed
at making the diaspora more inclined to use its capacity for
national development must extend beyond the symbolic.
This calls for a greater role for the home government in
establishing the institutional framework within which the
diaspora can be encouraged and coordinated to maximize
its developmental impact.15 Nevertheless, the introduction
of special schemes and incentives has the potential to
cause conflict between locals and returning migrants,
especially where such schemes result in marked wage
disparities or inequities. Thomas-Hope (1998b) also notes
the importance of attaining a fit between the skills of
returnees and gaps in the home country’s labour market.
There should also be a desire within the home country to
learn from the experiences and skills of the diaspora,
which is not always the case.
Table 1 presents a list of the factors that affect a diaspora’s
and returning migrants’ contribution to the home country.
Collectively, they will guide the discussion and analysis
of the cases of Ireland and the Caribbean, to which I 
now turn.
The Role of the Diaspora in 
Ireland’s Development
Ireland’s diaspora stands out among global diaspora
communities. Some authors (such as Boylan, 2002; and
Taylor, 2002) credit the use of social partnerships and 
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15 Nations such as India and China have not left this simply up to individual
goodwill. Rather, they have introduced schemes aimed at encouraging return or
contribution from their diasporas. For example, China encourages return entre-
preneurship through Returning Students Venture Parks and other incentives (Sax-
enian, 2001), while India has introduced special schemes to entice professionals to
return to teach in Indian universities (Séguin, Singer and Daar, 2006).
Table 1. Factors Affecting the Diaspora’s 
(and Returning Migrant’s) Contribution to the Home Country
Factor Impact
Number of returnees Large numbers – greater impact; small numbers
may be absorbed
Timing of return “[M]igrants arriving in dribs and drabs would 
have less impact than a single wave”
Duration of absence The longer the stay abroad, the more skills acquired
Social class Economic and cultural impact will be felt more from 
professionals and graduates
Difference between Opportunities to use acquired skills
host & home
Nature of return Movement should be organized and linked to national 
and regional economic policies
Inclination to contribute There should be a willingness or desire to invest in 
the home country
Capacity The more capacity and resources, the greater the impact 
Investment climate An attractive investment climate will heighten the impact
Fit between skills & Greater use and impact of skills for development
needs at home 
Source: Adapted from Bovenkerk (1974); 
Thomas-Hope (1998a & b); Esman (2006).
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Ireland’s stringent macroeconomic policies as major 
reasons for the emergence of the “Celtic Tiger”; others,
however (such as Burnham, 2003; Bartley and Kitchin,
2007; and Finnegan and McCarron, 2000), are keen to
highlight the diaspora’s role in this development – a
theme that occupies this section of the paper.
Ireland’s History of Migration
Consideration of a diaspora’s contribution does not begin
at the point of settlement in the host country, but with the
decision to leave home. Indeed, in Ireland’s case, migration
has been a defining feature of life since the sixth century,
when Irish monks began travelling to Iceland and various
parts of the European continent (see Ahern, 2003). Emi-
gration has since come to be viewed as “a rite of passage…
one means by which young people make the transition to
adulthood” (Gmelch, 1986: 153).16 According to Bielenberg,
“Ireland’s geographical situation as a relatively under-
developed and overpopulated economy located between
two dynamic societies in Britain and the United States
created the conditions for the country to become an emi-
grant nursery” (2000:19). This aspect of Ireland’s history
has produced a strong international Irish presence, most
notably in Australia, Britain, Argentina, the United States
and Canada (Coogan, 2000), and by 2007 around 70 million
people worldwide claimed Irish descent. Where emigrants
once were seen as defectors or traitors, they are now seen
as heroes who have helped their country realize unprece-
dented levels of growth and development (Sheffer, 2003). 
The key driving force behind Ireland’s long history of
migration has always been economic. It was not until the
agricultural crisis and accompanying famine of the mid-
nineteenth century, however, that the rate of migration
advanced enormously. Cleary and Connolly notes that,
“between 1801 and 1921…approximately 44 million people
left Ireland” (2005: 7). As an indication of the extent of the
trend, at the time of the famine, the population stood at
around 8.5 million; by the 1960s, this had shrunk to around
4.5 million (Finnegan and McCarron, 2000: 38). In the
nineteenth century, 80 percent of Irish migrants left for
the United States; since that time, however, the majority
has gone to the United Kingdom (Cleary and Connolly,
2005: 16). This steady wave of migration was in response
to economic and social problems at home. Even as late as
1986, Gmelch found that 76 percent of men and 67 percent
of women surveyed about their main reason for leaving
Ireland cited economic factors for doing so (1986: 153), while
Burnham (2003) describes Ireland as having a flagging
economy marked by high unemployment rates up to the
latter part of the 1980s. Since that time, however, Ireland
has developed significantly – its increasing prosperity
suggested in its GDP per capita, which, by 2004, 
had become the second highest in the world17 – and, as
Burnham (2003) notes, its diaspora receives significant
credit for this development.
The Economic Contribution of the Irish Diaspora
The relationship between the Irish diaspora and the home
country has gone through various phases over the years.
Although home governments might not always have
acknowledged the presence and role of the diaspora, the
community has always contributed to Irish society.
Indeed, the diaspora has been a longstanding and mostly
silent partner of successive Irish governments, helping to
deflect the country from total economic ruin throughout
the difficult periods in the nation’s history.
One way in which this unseen partnership has been felt
is in the area of remittances. For instance, Duff notes that
“the Irish of New York City alone sent $8 million in the
famine year of 1848” (1971: 9). Remittances also proved
an important mainstay of the Irish economy in the World
War II period. Later, in the 1980s remittances helped raise
living standards by supplementing household incomes,
serving as “compensation for the separation of a family
member” (Bielenberg, 2000: 59). 
Another way in which the diaspora has contributed to
Ireland is through travel and tourism receipts. In 1993,
for instance, it was estimated that ethnic or heritage
tourism accounted for around 1.5 percent of Ireland’s
gross national product (Glór an Deoraí, 1993). The very
large size of Ireland’s diaspora has meant that, unlike,
say, the Caribbean islands, the country has not had to
channel much of its resources into advertising its product.
Kelly suggests that the rate of growth in Ireland’s tourism
numbers and expenditures outstripped the global average
in the 1990s, with the most popular activities falling into
the area of heritage or cultural tourism (2007: 170-71).
Indeed, the wealth of the Irish diaspora also enables this
group to undertake such travel.
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16 Bielenberg echoes a similar sentiment, observing that, “even before the famine
years (1845-1852) emigration became established as a permanent feature of Irish
life, with children reared in Ireland but destined to settle abroad” (2000: 21).
17 Of course, the economic crises gripping global economies since 2007-2008 have
had a profound impact on Ireland’s economy threatening to erode some of these
gains. Nevertheless, these recent events do not erode the significance of the Irish
diaspora as a developmental force. Indeed, a case can be made for considering the
potential of this group in assisting the country (and others where diasporas have
been active) to respond to some of these new and emerging economic challenges.
While the impact of emigrant loyalty on the sale and
marketing of products from the homeland is less easy to
assess or quantify, the export of ethnic goods is another
way in which the diaspora affects the nation’s economy.
Another indication is that, in the 1990s, it was estimated
that around 20 percent of bank accounts in Ireland were
held by individuals in the diaspora (Glór an Deoraí, 1993).
The Diaspora’s Social and Welfare Function
The more recent literature has tended to favour the eco-
nomic contribution of diasporas to the home country, but
their social and welfare function must also be emphasized.
For example, diasporas’ remittances have helped to reduce
the potential for civil unrest and discontent during harsh
economic crises and, more generally, have proven useful
in helping citizens to meet social and welfare needs while
limiting pressure on the state. As Finnegan and McCarron
note in the Irish case, “the problems of unemployment,
education, and social services would have challenged the
capacity of the government of the Republic to respond
without a serious breakdown in legitimacy” (2000: 96). 
Migration has also helped to reduce unemployment rates
and, in so doing, the diaspora has acted to help reduce
social and economic hardships (and, at times, religious
conflict) by providing a means of relief. Where the state
proved incapable of handling the demands of the popu-
lation, migration has offered a route of escape and self-
actualization in “greener pastures.” Thus, as Finnegan and
McCarron point out, the diaspora has helped the Irish
government to maintain its legitimacy and credibility.
Bielenberg accentuates this point by noting that the dias-
pora assuaged “the pressure on elites (English up to 1922
and Irish thereafter) to provide not only work but a
decent life for the people of Ireland left behind” (2000: 21).
The Diaspora’s Contribution to Politics
A consideration of the role played by the diaspora in 
Ireland’s development should include discussion of the
political activities of this group – particularly of the role
of advocacy and activism within the diaspora (at home
and abroad). One such role may be seen in the Northern
Ireland conflict. Through the Ireland Fund, the diaspora
has been instrumental in raising and donating funds to
aid the search for peace and reconciliation in Northern
Ireland. Its activities have also extended to education,
arts and culture, as well as community development in
both the Republic and Northern Ireland. More than 20
years of engagement has been facilitated through this
means, during which the fund has donated around 
US$300 million, with around half coming from the US
branch (Ireland Fund Organization, 2007).
Indeed, it is in the United States that the Irish diaspora
has been able to exercise its most far-reaching and active
political roles. In noting its success in heightening relations
between Ireland and the US, Kenny writes: “Today, the
American Irish enjoy an unprecedented economic and
political power…In some ways, connections between the
Irish at home and abroad are closer than ever before”
(2003: 6). It is here, too, that the individual contributions
of members of the diaspora can be observed. Among
these is the role played by former US politician Bruce
Morrison in easing the restrictions on securing visas in
the 1990s. Morrison played a decisive role in pushing for
the Immigration Act of 1990 (also known as the Morrison
Visa Program), which allowed the issue of 40,000 visas
over a three-year period, 40 percent of which was set
aside for Irish nationals. The diaspora thus has been
instrumental in increasing access and opportunities for
countrymen through advocacy in the host country, a feat
aided by its large numbers, wealth and history of presence
in the United States, as well as by its level of political
activism in Washington. This activism, however, has not
always been strictly peaceful. Cochrane, for instance,
notes that Irish-American lobby groups in the United
States have also funded militant republican organizations
in Northern Ireland (2007: 25). Thus, while the diaspora
has played a largely positive role, there has been a more
subversive element in its activities in the home country as
well. Nonetheless, the presentation thus far suggests both
a desire and capacity within the diaspora to contribute to
Irish society and economy, even without explicit assistance
or direction from the state.
Establishing the Conditions for the 
Diaspora’s Involvement
A key factor in the diaspora’s involvement in the Irish
economy is the incentives Ireland provides to encourage
it. Such incentives include symbolic gestures meant to
ignite feelings of nationalism and allegiance for Ireland
and to acknowledge the role of the diaspora in the
nation’s growth.18 These gestures have been accompanied
by tangible moves to establish and strengthen bonds
between the diaspora and the home country. For example,
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18 Former president Mary Robinson, for example, has been keen to acknowledge
the existence of the diaspora and its connection with Ireland in her official speeches
and gestures. See Finnegan and McCarron (2000).
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the Irish government has offered funding to meet the
welfare needs of the diaspora (Ireland, 2003).
Still other initiatives have been aimed specifically at creat-
ing the conditions to attract investments to the country
and modernizing the economy. These remain some of the
most significant moves that have created the conditions
necessary for the diaspora’s return and investment. 
Burnham (2003) notes a shift in the 1950s away from the
inward-looking stance that characterized Irish policy
from the 1920s onward to placing more attention on
attracting foreign investment, particularly from the
United States. This move, combined with Ireland’s entry
into the European Common Market in 1973, helped the
economy to adjust. Importantly however, whereas invest-
ments in the 1950s were not necessarily matched with
national developmental imperatives, there has since been
an emphasis on rectifying this oversight. Industrial plan-
ning is now informed by the need to ensure that invest-
ments accentuate the goals of the domestic economy.
Support secured through its membership in the European
Union also helped Ireland to rationalize and modernize
its institutions.19
Regulatory and technological improvements in the
telecommunications industry also helped to reduce the
cost of business. In particular, the focus on exports and the
information technology (IT) industry meant that devel-
opments in the telecommunications market from the late
1970s onward were to play a significant role in laying the
foundations for Ireland to take advantage of the boom in
the communications industry during the 1980s and 1990s.
Additionally, the liberalization of transport (air and sea)
also helped reduce the cost of travel and, hence, the cost
of conducting business in Ireland. Collectively, these moves
had the spillover effect of reducing the cost of travel for
tourists, among them members of the diaspora who took
advantage of cheap fares from companies such as
Ryanair to travel from Europe and the United Kingdom
(see Schware and Hume, 1996: 9-10; and Burnham, 2003:
537-56).
Improvement in the quality and number of university
graduates has helped produce a greater pool of human
resources in fields important for Ireland’s growth and
development. Even when emigration was the norm, atten-
tion was paid to developing the educational system and
raising standards, so that Ireland had highly skilled indi-
viduals among its emigrants and among those who stayed
at home. By bolstering its stock of human capital, Ireland
was able to take full advantage of the financial capital
that began to enter its borders by the end of the 1980s.
Moreover, the Irish government undertook certain 
measures in the 1980s to accentuate these earlier policies,
heightening the economy’s readiness for growth. Most
notable was the decision to exercise stringent fiscal restraint
by downsizing government and cutting expenditure and
taxes. Additionally, the social partnership model of gov-
ernance ensured that development was guided by the
principles of fairness, equity and collective effort. Under
this model, trade unions, government and the private
sector engaged in joint negotiations to establish specific
goals and strategies for the country – among them, wage
restraint (see Taylor, 2002; and Roche and Cradden, 2003).
The adoption and successful implementation of such
measures highlighted a commitment to macro-stability, a
move that proved attractive to investors and established
the foundation for the reduction of the overall tax rate
achieved in the 1990s (Burnham, 2003). The Irish govern-
ment has also been keen to ensure that its tax system is
favourable to international investors. An attractive tax
regime that pulled in investment, therefore, helped to
make Ireland one of the most open economies in the
world, with the 1990s witnessing a fivefold increase in
investment from the United States (see Eircom, 2004).20
Investments were encouraged in export industries, while
the emphasis on countries such as the United States
helped to diversify trade relations away from a historical
dependence on the UK market. This is seen in the incen-
tives given in sectors such as telecommunications and
informatics, where aid for setting up businesses in Ireland
and reductions in the cost of communications have drawn
investments mainly from the United States (Forge, 1995).
These have had a multiplier effect on the country’s econ-
omy, insofar as the benefits of heightened communica-
tions and IT services have spilled over into other indus-
tries, such as banking, manufacturing and insurance. 
The Irish Development Agency has played a significant
role in attracting such investments from the United States
(Schware and Hume, 1996: 21). The work of such bodies
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19 Ireland’s membership in the EU and, even more, the creation of the European
Single Market in 1992 guaranteed funding for modernization programs as well as
access to markets beyond the United Kingdom. The adoption of the euro in 1999
also might have allowed Ireland to benefit from reduced interest rates (The Economist.
October 14, 2004).
20 Burnham (2003) also notes that the existence of a legal system built on the English
common law and the general use of the English language made communications
and relocating business from places such as the United Kingdom and the United
States fairly easy.
has been made easier, however, by the significant numbers
of the diaspora who possess the willingness, capital and
expertise to contribute to growth. As the economy began
to grow and labour shortages became pronounced in the
1990s, strategies were undertaken to attract migrants,
among them people of Irish descent and those who had
left the country in the previous decades. Programs aimed
at marketing Ireland as an attractive work destination
helped to encourage the return of many of the diaspora. 
The government’s efforts to forge relations with and
entice the resources of the diaspora marked a departure
from earlier relations with this group. In previous years,
successive Irish governments had expressed little interest
in acknowledging the diaspora or assisting those who
were displaced in foreign countries. Moreover, in the
aftermath of independence in 1922, there was little enthu-
siasm among politicians to visit or engage with Britain,
where so many of the diaspora lived (see O’Sullivan, 1994;
Coogan, 2000). Official relations between the government
and the diaspora, therefore, were cool, with connections
between Ireland and its diaspora being maintained
largely through family relations. The government’s current
attention to the welfare needs of Irish people abroad
marks an evolution in its approach to diaspora relations
toward a focus on how both can work together for their
mutual benefit. 
The Role of Returning Migrants
The role of macro planning in the emergence of the Celtic
Tiger cannot be underestimated. Nonetheless, the contri-
bution of the diaspora, particularly investors and returning
migrants, to the success of development planning cannot
be ignored. As Finnegan and McCarron note, 
[e]ven with government assistance, deficiencies in invest-
ment capital, management skills, and entrepreneurial
energy was noted in a 1992 report on industrial failures
in Ireland…[Additionally] government assistance in
generating foreign investment created firms involved
in assembly and processing, not high value-added 
economic activities…while providing jobs they did not
spill over into other sectors and generate growth.
(2000: 104-05)
It was, however, the diaspora’s involvement combined
with sound government policy at the right point (as well
as EU support) that helped Ireland to develop. Key gov-
ernment figures have also pointed out that it was the
knowledge, innovation and energy of the diaspora that
helped the nation to develop (Ahern, 2007: 13). 
Commentators have also acknowledged the role of
returning migrants and the diaspora in developing the IT
industry – one of the pillars of economic growth (see
Burnham, 2003; Arora and Gambardell, 2004). In this case,
members of the diaspora returned with the networks,
wealth and skills acquired abroad. As Burnham (2003)
notes, the majority of new jobs created in the 1990s were
in foreign-owned firms. With this growth in employment
and the economy, the country was to witness a turnaround
in net migration figures, which began levelling off in the
early 1990s, then, for the first time in its history, went on
to gains from the mid-1990s. Although many of these were
immigrants from other countries, a significant portion
was from the diaspora as they returned to take advantage
of the country’s growth.21 Moreover, while the numbers
were significant, most of the returnees were concentrated
in specific sectors in which there were labour shortages
and, as Walter et al. note, many were the young and 
economically active who had gone abroad to work and
study in the late 1970s to early 1980s. Further, the economic
and social status of migrants from the diaspora exceeded
that found among non-migrants: whereas 31.7 percent of
Irish returnees had gone beyond secondary education, only
16.8 percent of non-migrants had done so (2002: 12, 20).
Indeed, the experience here provides a strong case against
the brain drain thesis, instead validating arguments on
brain circulation and brain gain with government invest-
ments in education reaping positive returns for the country.
That is not to say, however, that the diaspora has been
welcomed unconditionally or that all sections of the society
have been willing to accept the innovation and change
brought by this group. Nonetheless, the diaspora’s overall
impact on innovation and enterprise has been remarkable,
providing the impetus for reform while helping to create
conditions that complemented the government’s macro-
economic policies. The role of the diaspora in this develop-
ment has been acknowledged by a government convened
Task Force which highlighted the value of remittances, of
voluntary diaspora organisations and their investments,
as well as the place of returning migrants in Irish economy.22
These findings provide a template for assessing the role
of diasporas in development and, specifically, the value
of the Irish experience for the Caribbean region. In the
next section, I assess the Caribbean’s experience with its
diaspora before moving on to compare the experiences of
the two cases.
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21 According to Bartley and Kitchin, 218,000 members of the diaspora along with
their families returned to Ireland between 1995 and 2004 (2007: 237).
22 See the Emigrant Advice Network (n.d.).
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The Diaspora’s Role in Development: 
The Caribbean Experience
Like Ireland’s, the Caribbean’s history and society have
been defined by migration (see Lapointe, 2004; Nurse,
2004; Reis, 2007). Foner contends that the Caribbean is
“more deeply and continuously affected by migration than
any other region in the world” (1998: 47). However, whereas
Ireland’s history is one of emigration, the Caribbean
experience prior to the 1940s was marked mainly by
immigration, both voluntary and forced. Emigration has
since become a more defining feature of the region’s
migratory patterns. Consequently, while difficulties arise
in defining the boundaries of the Irish diaspora, this
point takes on an even larger significance in the case of
the Caribbean diaspora.
A definition of the “Caribbean diaspora” is not easily
arrived at, not least because of the inherent difficulties in
using such a term. Reis, for instance, notes that defining
the diaspora is a complex task given the region’s diversity
(2006: 45-46). Historical events such as slavery, indenture-
ship and colonization gave rise to a region with diverse
nationalities, religion, language and racial and ethnic
make-up. These are compounded by differences in political
systems, heritage and customs. Such heterogeneity makes
it difficult to speak definitively of a “Caribbean diaspora.”23
As such, there exists no consensus as to the definition or
composition of the Caribbean diaspora (Reis, 2007; see also
Olwig, 2007). Even so, I use the “Caribbean diaspora” to
refer to individuals from CARICOM countries “who
actually migrated, [and] also a large number of second
and third generation dependents, born in host countries”
(CARICOM Secretariat, 2006). However, although I
attempt to speak to the experiences of the region as a
whole, the parsimony of work on all CARICOM states
means that the discussion at times might be unbalanced
in favour of the English-speaking Caribbean and other
larger Caribbean territories such as the Dominican
Republic and Haiti. 
The History of Caribbean Migration
Like that of Ireland, the creation and growth of the
Caribbean diaspora can be attributed to a number of 
economic factors. Since early in the twentieth century,
Caribbean people have left home in search of employment
opportunities in other lands, often lured by US investments
in Latin America (see Palmer, 2007; Reis, 2007). However,
the first significant wave of emigration took place in
1948, when 492 Jamaicans left for the United Kingdom.
These and successive emigrants from the region were to
play a key role in helping to rebuild that country after the
ravages of World War II. The wave of independence
across the region in the 1960s served to reduce opportu-
nities for people in former British colonies to travel to the
United Kingdom, so migrants turned their attention to
countries such as the United States and Canada, resulting
in the diversification of migratory paths. Migration to the
United States was aided by the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965, which allowed Caribbean nationals to enter
and work there (Palmer, 2007: 2-3). 
Since independence, the economies of most English-
speaking nations across the region have not advanced to
developed country status, as occurred in Ireland. Instead,
countries such as Jamaica and Guyana continue to be
hampered by sluggish economies. In Haiti, around 80
percent of the population is believed to exist below the
poverty line (Virtue, 2007: 4). As such, economic motivation
continues to drive migration as Caribbean nationals 
are lured by the prospects offered in more advanced
economies (Greenidge, 2007).
The main destinations for Caribbean nationals have been
the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada,
resulting in the region’s diaspora population in these
countries estimated at around six million in 1996, exclud-
ing undocumented migrants (Nurse, 2004: 3).24 When
considered as a proportion of population size, the
Caribbean has one of the largest diaspora communities in
the world. This point is amply illustrated in the case of
Jamaica, where it is estimated that 2.6 million Jamaicans
live abroad, almost the same size of the local population,
which is currently estimated at 2.7 million (Templer, 2002).
Moreover, since many Caribbean islands are among the
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23 For instance, the Caribbean is demarcated based on its colonial past. There is
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the union of mainly English-speaking
Caribbean territories, including Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados,
Jamaica, Belize, Saint Lucia, among others (over the years, it has extended its
membership to include countries such as Haiti, with others, including the Domini-
can Republic, having observer status). Then there are French- Spanish- and Dutch-
speaking territories. These are also differentiated by political systems, with some
being part of the Commonwealth, some republics and still others remaining as
overseas territories of the United States, the United Kingdom, France or the
Netherlands. Accompanying these are diverse judicial systems handed down
through colonial ties.
24 With 4.7 million, the United States is believed to have the largest portion of this
group, followed by the United Kingdom with 0.6 million, the Netherlands with
0.25, France with 0.2 and Canada with 0.15 million (Nurse, 2004: 3).
middle-income group of developing countries, would-be
migrants are better able to afford the costs of migrating
than is the case for those in, say, most African countries
(Adams and Page, 2003). Proximity to the United States
and Canada also helps. As such, migration has been
encouraged in the Caribbean as a means of easing unem-
ployment, particularly among the unskilled (Palmer,
1990: 9).25
Social Functions of Migration and the Diaspora
As a starting point to assessing the diaspora’s role in
development within the region, the function of this group
in population transfer must be highlighted. For instance,
Nurse points out that the smaller Caribbean territories,
such as Grenada and St. Kitts and Nevis, have experienced
annual labour migration rates that account for around 
12 percent of total population (2004: 3). As in Ireland,
migration helps to lessen social dislocation and local dis-
content, allowing populations the opportunity to fulfill
their aspirations elsewhere. While the Caribbean consists
largely of stable democracies, instances of political unrests
have seen displaced persons and political asylum seekers
from countries such as Haiti and Cuba joining the expa-
triate community. Problems with violent crime have seen
some Jamaicans choosing emigration as an option for
personal security. Countries such as Jamaica, Guyana and
Trinidad and Tobago have also suffered from low trust,
divisive politics and allegations of corruption, which have
manifested in reduced levels of support for government
institutions and increased desire to migrate (see, for exam-
ple, Jones, 1992, 2004; Minto, 2006; and Waller et al., 2007). 
The diaspora’s contribution has also been obvious in
areas of social and welfare services across the region. In
particular, sector-specific diaspora groups have helped to
bolster the health care and education services of many
Caribbean territories.26 This has been achieved through
voluntary contributions and fundraising activities from
the diaspora, a contribution that, for the most part, has
developed independently of government involvement.
The contribution of diaspora groups is also visible in
helping countries in the region to respond to the devasta-
tion caused by natural disasters such as hurricanes. In
other instances, diaspora groups have helped to introduce
new efficiencies in governance and administration by
passing down techniques and innovations gained in
developed host countries. 
However, some features of migration in the region have
been less pleasant than others. The migration of women
and mothers, for instance, has been seen as indicative of
the breakdown of families and society across the region.
According to Nurse (2004), trends in countries such as
Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica
also indicate that more women are migrating, which is
viewed as a cause for concern across the region. 
Brain Drain and Returning Migrants
The characteristics of the migrating population have
evolved as the direction of migration has evolved over
the years. Namely, migrants from the region during the
early and mid-twentieth century were mainly unskilled and
sought better employment opportunities in other countries.
Better-skilled and educated individuals subsequently
have been attracted by prospects of higher income and
living standards in the countries of the north. Although
disparities exist in the size of the brain drain across the
region, there is little doubt that it has had significant
implications for the region’s developmental capacity.
Evidence of the negative effect of brain drain is most
poignant in the context of such countries as Jamaica,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. Brain drain from
Jamaica to the United Kingdom has been considerable,
with 33 percent of migrants to that country having second-
ary-level education (Carrington and Detragiache, 1999).
Table 2 gives an indication of the significance of these
numbers in the context of Caribbean emigrants to the
United States in 1990 and 2000; particularly remarkable is
that more than 40 percent of migrants have tertiary-level
education. Moreover, with the exception of Guyana, the
skilled and highly educated increased as a proportion of
total migrants between 1990 and 2000 for the countries 
in the sample, perhaps as a result of the growing trend 
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25 This has been done tacitly as well as directly, through programs such as the
Canadian Farm Works Program involving the Jamaican government.
26 For instance, the Jamaica Hospitals League of Friends was formed in 1990 by a
group of Jamaican health care professionals living in the United Kingdom who
recognized and sought to introduce measures to help fill the gaps that existed in
the provision of health care on the island, given the Jamaican government’s inability
to do so at adequate levels. The League garners support from the diaspora and
interested groups in the United Kingdom in order to raise funds for its cause. The
group also has a network of partners in Jamaica, including its local agents and the
Ministry of Health, which help to identify needs and monitor the delivery of assis-
tance sent from the group. Its partners also include private shipping companies in
the United Kingdom and Jamaica, which help to expedite the delivery of medical
equipment and supplies to the island. The group’s modernization and problem-
solving function comes from identifying areas of need and solutions, and helping
to update and modernize medical supplies and equipment in the island’s hospitals
and medical centres. Its networking and leveraging purpose is seen in the group’s
practice of linking with groups of similar interest in the United Kingdom and
enlisting their support as well as the resources of the diaspora in that country. See
Minto (2007).
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in developed countries to target such individuals (for
example, teachers and nurses) in Caribbean territories.27
More recent figures suggest that, overall, around 80 percent
of individuals in Jamaica, Haiti, Grenada and Guyana
with tertiary-level education have migrated, compared
with 10 percent for the rest of South America and 15 to 20
percent for Mexico and Central America (Fajnzylber and
López, 2008: 6-7). Moreover, 77.2 percent of Haitians and
74.7 percent of Jamaicans among these highly educated
migrants were between the ages of 25 and 65 (OECD,
2008: 73). These educated, skilled and economically active
individuals represent a considerable loss to the region.
Increased investment in education might be beneficial to
the home country, but, as Palmer observes, it also leads to
increased migration of the most skilled and educated
(1990: 5) and to the loss of the money spent on education
by the home government, particularly for those who do
not then contribute (through remittances or skills) to the
home country – indeed, in the Jamaican case, such groups
tend not to remit as much as other migrants. Thus, while
the brain drain might have morphed into a “brain gain”
for countries such as Ireland, the case remains less con-
vincing for individual Caribbean countries such as Jamaica.
The problem is compounded when, as is the case in many
English-speaking Caribbean countries, teachers are among
the better-trained and experienced émigrés. This can have
ironic and dangerous consequences where the gains from
increased budgetary allocation do not correlate positively
with increased quality, since governments cannot realis-
tically use migration as an argument for decreased
spending. This dilemma is compounded by the irony of
high unemployment in the midst of gaps in the labour
force (Nurse, 2004).28
In response, governments in the region have either con-
templated or actually implemented schemes aimed at
attracting skilled migrants to return.29 Indeed, islands such
as Haiti and Jamaica have gone beyond this to actually
establish government departments with responsibility
for diaspora affairs. As Parks (2004) notes, however, the
introduction of special programs geared at the diaspora
might pose some difficulty for relations within the home
country. Nonetheless, organizations such as the Inter-
American Development Bank have recommended that
governments in the region adopt a concerted approach in
attracting the diaspora to return home (Lapointe, 2004). 
One must therefore conclude, tentatively, that the argu-
ments against brain drain are less robust in the context of
the Caribbean diaspora. That is, brain circulation and brain
gain have been less felt in the Caribbean than in Ireland.30
Most notably, while there has been a significant wave of
returning migrants to Ireland, this has not been the case
in the Caribbean. Further, the trickle of returning residents
has included retirees (Palmer, 2007), as opposed to the
economically active groups that typified immigration to
Ireland in the 1990s, while returnees in other categories
have not been in sufficient numbers or concentrated
within a specific time frame so as to make a significant
impact on the economy and society. That is, migrants
with wealth and experience have not returned at a level
sufficient to encourage the degree of innovation to spur
wide systemic changes across the Caribbean. Furthermore,
the emphasis has been more on meeting social and welfare
needs through voluntary donations as opposed to the
implementation of specific investment or business schemes. 
Politics and the Diaspora
One area in which the impact of the diaspora and returning
migrants has been felt is in the development of politics in
home countries. Particularly in the immediate pre- and
post-independence period in the English-speaking terri-
tories, a number of migrants who had been educated in
the United Kingdom returned to the region with the
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Table 2. Immigration to the United States, Total and with
Tertiary-Level Education, Selected Countries, 1990 and 2000
Immigrants
Total Tertiary-Level
Immigrants Education Percentage
Country 1990 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000
Dominican Republic 187,871 687,675 42,451 145,560 22.6 27.7
Jamaica 159,913 553,825 66,633 203,655 41.7 45.2
Trinidad & Tobago 65,810 197,400 30,330 75,995 46.1 47.7
Guyana 61,936 211,190 24,236 69,375 40.7 40.3
Source: Carrington and Detragiache (1998: 16); United States (2005).
28 Islands such as Jamaica and Trinidad experienced shortages of around 58 
percent and 53 percent, respectively, in nursing in 2003 (United Nations, 2004).
29 Thomas-Hope had observed from the 1990s a steady increase in the number of
returnees from the Jamaican diaspora, with the majority coming from the United
States and the United Kingdom (1998b).
30 This is also substantiated by research that suggests that brain drain is more
likely to affect small developing countries (see Thouez, 2005).
27 For instance, Jamaican teachers and nurses have been sought by recruitment
agencies in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom in recent years.
Already a debate has begun in Jamaica on the relationship between migration and
what is seen as the falling quality and pass rate of students in regionally based
exams relative to other islands. Migration of some of the most successful teachers
is seen as one of the root causes.
energy and ideas to dominate the political landscape in
their respective countries – among them, Grantley Adams
in Barbados, Forbes Burnham in Guyana, Michael Manley
in Jamaica, Lester Bird in Antigua and Eric Williams in
Trinidad and Tobago.
The diaspora’s contribution to politics also can be assessed
in terms of its activities in the host country. The diaspora
has evolved out of various economic, social and political
motivations. Where migration has occurred due to political
reasons, there might be less inclination to give economic
support to the government. In such cases, the diaspora
might also use its power in the host country to fight for
regime change at home. Members of the Cuban diaspora,
for instance, have not been eager to make investments in
their country, but instead have supported trade policies
aimed at bruising the Castro government. The power of
business and political leaders in the diaspora, however,
has been expressed mainly at the community level. Thus,
whereas, the Irish have used their power to heighten the
profile of Irish-US relations, this has not been the case 
in the Caribbean diaspora (Lucas, 2007), despite their
activism at the community level. Differences in levels of
political activism and achievements might be explained
by differences in the size, influence and wealth of the
Caribbean and Irish diasporas. 
The Economic Contribution of the Caribbean Diaspora
Discussion of the impact of migration and the role of the
region’s diaspora traditionally has been framed in terms
of the brain drain debate. However, more recent research
in the area has tended toward a more nuanced debate on
the ways in which the diaspora has helped or hindered the
economies of the region. The role of remittances occupies
much space in this new research. Indeed, the growing
significance of this form of income to regional economies
warrants such a focus.
As an indication of its size, the Caribbean and Latin
American diaspora has a 30 percent share of worldwide
remittances to developing countries, with around US$36.9
billion entering the region in 2004. With the decline in
agricultural receipts and official development assistance,
the value of remittances to the overall economy of countries
such as Jamaica, Haiti and the Dominican Republic has
increased in recent years compared with other sources of
funding and as a portion of GDP, as Table 3 shows. Table
4 further notes the trend in remittances between 2001 and
2007, indicating an increase of more than 100 percent in
receipts across selected Caribbean territories.31
More recent figures on remittances indicate that their
share of the economy throughout the region has increased.
For instance, it has been suggested that as much as 
40 percent of Haiti’s GDP comes from money sent by its
diaspora, while the Dominican Republic receives little
under US$3 billion per year (Greenidge, 2007: 5; Lucas,
2007:1).32 Such levels of remittances have prompted Cassell
to note them as “the cornerstone of Diaspora linkage and
involvement”; he also notes that remittances have helped
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Table 3. Remittances, Other Financial Inflows and GDP, 
Selected Countries, 2005 
Remittances as Remittances as
a % of Official a % of Foreign Remittances
Country Remittances Development Direct Investment as a % of GDP
(US$ millions) (%) (%) (%)
Dominican 2,682 3,484 298 9
Republic
Haiti 1,077 209 11,313 28
Jamaica 1,651 4,619 275 18
Source: Inter-American Development Bank; available at:
http://www.iadb.org/countries/index.cfm.
31 Writing specifically of the increases between 1996 and 2001, Bullock (2005)
notes that growth in the Jamaican remittance market might be explained by
increasing labour migration, the increased reach of transfer companies, greater
involvement of financial intermediaries and greater capacity in technology; such
explanations still hold sway. However, the continuing decline of some economies
in the region – in particular, Jamaica and Haiti – and the increased value of remit-
tances to household incomes might also explain the increase in the amount of
funds being remitted to these countries.
32 In Jamaica, remittances represented 19 percent of GDP in 2005; the Inter-American
Development Bank reports remittances in 2006 of US$623 per capita, the largest in
the region. Remittances also represented 104 percent of Jamaica’s total exports and
182 percent of its alumina exports, a traditional foreign-exchange earner. In Belize,
remittances, at US$300 per capita in 2005, were a quarter of total exports. In the
Dominican Republic, remittances were US$302 per capita in 2005 and represented
around 45 percent of the value of total exports. The case of Guyana also stands out
in terms of the value of remittances to the overall economy, representing 34.1 percent
of GDP and five times the revenues gained from tourism. Trinidad and Tobago, in
contrast, has one of the lowest levels of dependence on remittances, at 0.7 percent
of GDP in 2005. See Inter-American Development Bank (2005, 2006).
Table 4. Remittances to Selected Caribbean Countries, 2001–2007
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
(US$ millions)
Dominican 1,807 2,112 2,217 2,438 2,682 2,900 3,120
Republic
Jamaica 968 1,229 1,426 1,497 1,651 1,770 1,975
Haiti 810 932 978 1,026 1,077 1,650 1,830
Guyana 90 119 137 143 270 270 424
Trinidad & Tobago 41 59 88 93 97 110 125
Total 3,716 4,451 4,846 5,197 5,777 6,700 7,474
Source: Adapted from the Inter-American Development Bank; available at:
http://www.remittances.eu/component/option,com_wrapper/Itemid,73/.
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to lessen balance-of-payment gaps in many territories in
the region (2007: 5, 7). While this might be the case, the
possible effect of remittances in fuelling the growth of a
consumption economy and the negative impact of this
consumption on the region’s imports and balance of pay-
ments are not to be ignored – indeed, Funkhouser’s 1992
study of remittances in Nicaragua found that recipients
had lower rates of participation in the labour force.
Remittances also represent a contribution to individual
household incomes rather than significant capital flows
or investment, which helps to scale back their wider
macroeconomic value (Ghosh, 2006). Over time, remittances
have grown to become a feature of welfare provision in
the Caribbean by replacing or augmenting public welfare
provision by governments in the region. 
Moreover, the cost attached to such transactions, which
are often sent through large firms such as Western Union,
has been prohibitive and might be seen as one factor that
has lessened the value of remittances as a developmental
aid. According to Nurse (2004), the average cost of remitting
funds to the region was around 12.5 percent in 2002, half
again as much as that charged for other regions. Orozco
(2003) sees this as the result of the underdeveloped
nature of the Caribbean and Central American remittance
market, given the prevalence of private monopolies and
oligopolies, and he recommends greater use of micro-
finance organizations, banks and credit unions to send
remittances. This is important since lack of effective 
regulation and the use of private institutions means a loss
of potential tax revenues for governments in the region.
As well, fewer than 10 percent of the recipients of remit-
tances in Latin America and Caribbean region have access
to bank accounts, loans or other basic financial services
(IADB, 2006: 14); recipients and senders also might lack
awareness of alternative uses for such funds. 
The Diaspora’s Contribution through Tourism
The economies of the region are highly dependent on
tourism. For example, travel and tourism is responsible
for around 63.5 percent of jobs in the Bahamas and for
50.8 percent of the country’s GDP. For Barbados, these
figures stand at 45.8 percent and 40.7 percent, respectively;
for St. Lucia, 40.2 percent and 40.6 percent; for the
Dominican Republic, 14.4 percent and 16.6 percent; and
for Jamaica, 27.1 percent and 30.8 percent, respectively
(World Travel and Tourism Council, 2008). Dependence
has heightened as the share of traditional sectors such as
agriculture have declined. The Caribbean remains an
attractive holiday location generally, but the diaspora
constitutes the largest segment of visitors – about 70 
percent, according to Nurse (2004) – demonstrating both
willingness and the ability to make this form of contri-
bution to the region. The diaspora returns largely for 
carnivals and other cultural and sporting events, as well
as to visit relatives and friends. Diaspora associations
also invite interest in and travel to the region. The real
size and contribution of this market, however, remains
largely unknown.
Trade and Entrepreneurial Investment
Trade and investment represent key ways in which the
Caribbean diaspora has been actively involved in the
economies at home. Rampersad notes that the diaspora is
“deeply sympathetic to nation building…[and is] more
inclined to invest their resources beyond the call of duty
because their drive is more zealous and passionate than
potential non West Indian investors.” Furthermore, “the
Diaspora is amongst the best equipped to shoulder the
responsibility as the sons and daughters who have proven
their abilities in the global market place” (2007:10). 
The emphasis in the past has been on the establishment
of small businesses both at home and in the host country.
However, investment trends have begun to shift slightly
with the formation of entrepreneurial and knowledge
networks in the diaspora. An indication of this shift 
may be seen in the formation of the Caribbean Business
Community Incorporated, which encourages Americans
to engage in business activities with the Caribbean in
order to attract trade and investments into the region.
Other groups include the Caribbean Digital Diaspora
Network, formed to promote IT development in the
region, and cultural diaspora networks in such areas as
music and fashion (Nurse, 2003). A Caribbean Business
Club encourages linkages between businesses in the
region and their counterparts in the diaspora and beyond
(Templer, 2002). Greater linkages are also being encouraged
among governments (through foreign ministries), national
investment promotion agencies and the diaspora in order
to provide more focused services as well as to integrate the
activities of the latter into national development planning. 
The region’s communications industry has also benefited
from the size of the diaspora. This has sometimes meant
that the number of calls coming into islands such 
as Jamaica has surpassed that of bigger countries. For
instance, Dunn and Gooden (1996) note that the total 
volume of calls terminating in Jamaica in 1993 was more
than that in countries such as Australia and India. In this
way, the diaspora contributes to the economies of the
region through the foreign exchange earned by its com-
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munications companies. Further, domestic telephone
rates in islands such as Jamaica have been artificially
deflated for almost two decades thanks to the size and
value of the international telecommunications market.
The export market for goods and services to the diaspora
remains an area with vast potential for Caribbean gov-
ernments. Food and music are two of the products from
the region that are in demand globally (see Nurse, 2004:
6; Rampersad, 2007: 8), and the markets for these goods
have expanded thanks to the networks and contacts
formed by the diaspora in host countries (Greenidge, 2007).
As Nurse notes, however, “[t]he majority of Caribbean
governments have yet to conceive of a Diasporic export
strategy as a viable means to further diversify their
economies and generate new exports and employment”
(2004: 6).
On the other hand, the costs involved in exporting and
restrictions placed on goods from developed countries
mean that private entrepreneurship is limited, as small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the region face
difficulties in meeting legal requirements or the standards
for trading with more developed countries. As Morrison
notes, there are limited investment vehicles in host coun-
tries that would encourage diaspora investments in the
region (2006). At home, SMEs face limited access to credit
and a high corporate tax rate, which hampers their sur-
vival and sustainability. Furthermore, the record of some
Caribbean countries, such as Jamaica, in protecting intel-
lectual property rights has not been optimal, resulting in
the further loss of export earnings. Lehman (2002: 2)
argues that Jamaica could benefit from a rise of at least 3
percent in its GDP if its intellectual property, particularly
in music, were adequately protected.
The Hidden Diaspora: Illegal Migrants and 
Criminal Diaspora Networks
While the positive side of the Caribbean diaspora has
been underscored, any assessment of the real or potential
role that the diaspora can play in development must also
consider the alternative to this view. The literature for the
most part has framed such considerations in terms of
brain drain, but globalization has also thrown up nega-
tive results, among them the development of transborder
crime and transnational criminal networks. 
The deportation of members of the diaspora who have
been involved in criminal activities in host countries has
seen the formation of another form of diaspora network –
one based on criminality.33 These individuals pose a serious
threat to the already limited crime-fighting skills and
resources of security forces in the region. They also con-
stitute a threat to national and regional development,
particularly where returnees lack the skills or capacity to
help the home country constructively. Dangers here are
profound when placed against the reality of programs
that select the best and brightest even while repatriating
those who have committed crimes (some of those also
being the least skilled and educated). Opportunities for
collective response to these dilemmas are in turn restrained
by the segmented nature of the region. Nonetheless, there is
scope for cooperation between host and home countries
in this regard. For instance, host countries have to varying
degrees provided resources to the home country to help
bolster crime fighting capacity and expertise within the
region. This can also include schemes to assist in the
resettlement of failed migrants and deportees. Such coop-
eration is important given the existence of transnational
criminal networks which increasingly means that the
removal of a person involved in criminality by the host
country does not essentially imply an end to the impact
of that person’s criminality in that country.
Another issue here is the existence of illegal immigrants
from the region. For the most part, the impact of the mass
of unaccounted Caribbean nationals residing in countries
such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom
remains largely unknown. Indeed, this poses practical
difficulties in assessing the full impact of the region’s
diaspora in the host and home countries with respect to,
for example, remittances.
Encouraging the Diaspora’s Involvement in 
Caribbean Development
Although the Caribbean diaspora is suitably placed to
invest in the region, in order for this group to act on their
passion and zeal, the region’s governments must create
conditions that help the diaspora to realize its potential.
As Lucas puts it, there is an absence of “institutionalized
platforms to organise the Diaspora to leverage their col-
lective talent and influence to address regional issues and
bilateral issues” (2007). 
One way to create such conditions would be through the
design of policies that allow the diaspora’s activities to be
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33 According to Nurse (2004), 34,411 persons were deported from the United
States between 1993 and 1999, many of whom were returned to the Caribbean. Of
these, around 70 percent had committed some form of criminal offence.
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more visibly scaled up.34 The diaspora’s contribution could
also be enhanced by adequate protection for investments
at home. For instance, lack of trust in state institutions
has driven informality in some countries, so that members
of the diaspora might be more willing to seek advice and
assistance on investment opportunities from family and
friends, rather than the home government. The risk here
is that business success could be affected by lack of access
to the advice and protection offered by state institutions.
Thus, where there is fraud, there is little avenue for redress,
further serving to frustrate the desires (and confidence)
of those who wish to invest in the local community. Even
where the decision is made to go through official channels,
the time taken in conducting business through an inefficient
and sometimes corrupt bureaucracy serves to dissuade
individuals from making a greater investment in the
home territory (see, for example, Mills and Robertson,
1990; Jones, 1992, 2004).
Nonetheless, individual territories in the region are
increasingly keen to devise ways of engaging with their
diasporas more directly and to maximize their impact on
growth and development. St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
for instance, allows its diaspora to participate in the
National Insurance Scheme, while St. Kitts and Nevis has
formed a secretariat for returning nationals. The trendsetter
in this area, however, is Haiti, which established a Ministre
des Haïtiens vivant à l’Étranger [Ministry of Haitians
Living Abroad] in 1995. Other islands have also started
initiatives to acknowledge and encourage their diasporas
(Reis, 2007). For example, the support of the International
Organisation for Migration (IOM) saw Jamaica initiating
a Return of Talent Programme aimed at attracting highly
skilled nationals back to the island. Since June 2004, the
island has organized a biennial diaspora conference,
introduced a department for Jamaicans overseas based
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade
and formed a Diaspora Board that includes representatives
from diasporas in the United Kingdom, Canada and the
United States and Jamaican government officials who
meet every six months. Trade and investment officials
have also met with diaspora groups in these three host
countries to apprise them of investment opportunities at
home, including a proposal for a Diaspora Bond. As well,
the increasing use of e-government in the region implies
greater opportunities for governments to interact more
frequently and openly with the diaspora while potentially
increasing the ability of the latter to conduct business 
at home.35
In summing up the contribution of the Caribbean diaspora
to the region, Orozco (2003) highlights the five “Ts” that
mark the areas in which it has made an impact on devel-
opment: tourism, transportation, telecommunications,
trade and transmission of monetary remittances. As has
been shown, the diaspora’s contribution is also evident 
in politics and the wider society. As it relates to the
approach of regional government, however, Reis notes
that “Caribbean governments are not adopting a proactive
stance vis-à-vis their Diasporic communities, despite the
fact that the new culture of migration is inextricably
linked to development and the potential to effect mean-
ingful change so vitally needed” (2006: 53). Nonetheless,
there are indications that this stance is changing; pledges
by CARICOM governments at a June 2007 meeting 
(Conference on the Caribbean: A 2020 Vision) potentially
mark a departure from the old approach. For instance,
the conference discussed the implementation of the
CARICOM Single Market and Economy which, in allow-
ing for the movement of CARICOM nationals across the
region, could reduce the number of skilled migrants who
choose to leave. The conference also aimed at assessing
how closer links could be formed with the diaspora and
how its resources and knowledge could be used to the
region’s advantage. (See The Dominican Net, 2007.) 
Comparative Analysis of the Irish and
Caribbean Cases
Having considered the experience of both the Caribbean
and Irish diasporas, a few similarities instantly stand out.
Among these, the dominance of economic motivations
remains poignant. Similarly, the important role that migra-
tion played in easing pressures at home and the significance
of remittances from expatriates also stands out. Migration,
mainly of the unskilled, has been encouraged (informally)
in both instances as a means of easing unemployment.
More recent years have seen a shift, with immigration
being encouraged to fill labour gaps in specific areas.
What is clear, too, is the largely unseen, longstanding and
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34 For instance, Lucas (2007) outlines a number of platforms on which the
Caribbean diaspora can assist the region, including the CARICOM–US Business
Council, which facilitates bilateral dialogue among business communities; a Com-
mittee of 100, which would develop policy dialogue across sectors and showcase
Caribbean culture; a CARICOM congressional caucus that would focus on the
issues in the US Congress; a CARICOM Society to highlight unique aspects of
Caribbean culture; and a CARICOM Youth Leadership Program.
35 In Jamaica, the computerization of government departments such as the Registrar
General’s Department and customs agencies now allows members of the diaspora
to request and pay for official documents online and to track shipments sent to the
island online.
only recently acknowledged partnership that exists
between the diasporas and their respective governments. 
Other points stand out to set the two cases apart, however,
which affect the extent to which the Irish experience is
useful as a blueprint for that of the Caribbean. Thus,
while the Caribbean diaspora undoubtedly has brought
benefits to the region, an assessment of the extent of this
contribution vis-à-vis that of the Irish diaspora is not nec-
essarily an easy exercise. The task of measuring the two
groups’ impact has to take into account the differences in
the size of the diasporas as well as the collective wealth
each possesses. The extent to which this is possible is 
limited to some degree by the existence of undocumented
members in the Caribbean diaspora and by the informal
means through which funds are at times remitted to the
Caribbean. Added to this is the practical consideration
that the analysis compares a country and a region. Further-
more, the diversity of the Caribbean introduces another
set of issues, which marks the region from the homogeneity
that largely typifies the Irish experience. Beyond these,
intervening variables such as government policy and the
nature of the investment climate (at home and abroad)
also affects the diaspora’s willingness and capacity to
contribute to local development in the two cases. 
Nevertheless, both the differences and similarities of 
the Irish experience merge to provide the Caribbean an
opportunity for understanding its relations with its dias-
pora. Even more, the Irish experience offers an opportunity
to learn how the region can engage with its diaspora
more constructively. In so doing, the Irish case provides a
blueprint from which regional governments can draw
ideas to design their own solutions as informed by
regional demands. As Virtue notes, the reality of the
Caribbean is one where, “island by island, underdevel-
opment remains the region’s dominant reality” (2007: 4).
What Constitutes the Diaspora?
One challenge is the difficulty of establishing the bound-
aries of the diaspora in both Ireland and the Caribbean.
This has become an issue for Ireland only in more recent
years, although its significance is not necessarily obvious
at first glance. However, the matter of definition has
emerged more poignantly with attempts to access the
rights and duties of the diaspora in the home country.
Thus, while the matter of definition has not affected the
contribution the diaspora has made to development in an
obvious way, it nonetheless has emerged in relation to the
right of members of the diaspora to the legal status of
Irish citizenship. 
This issue might also have increasing resonance in the
Caribbean in light of expressions among some members
of the diaspora of a desire to participate more directly in
home governance through the electoral process. In time,
these claims could make the issue of definition more
pressing, particularly if home governments agree to the
diaspora’s having more than just an input through remit-
tances and investment. The way the Irish have dealt with
this through symbolic gestures and modification of its
constitution might provide useful lessons for how the
Caribbean could deal with similar concerns while 
avoiding tensions.
Definitional issues are also relevant at the regional and
national levels. The heterogeneity that exists in the
Caribbean poses certain challenges to the notion of a
“Caribbean diaspora” and has had a significant impact
on the region and its ability to act concertedly. The expe-
riences of CARICOM in forming a common market and
efforts to form joint institutional mechanisms, such as the
Caribbean Court of Justice, stand out as examples of the
difficulty of achieving collective action. The extent to
which the region can mobilize its diaspora for collective
action and engagement across individual territories,
therefore, remains uncertain. 
This heterogeneity and the complexities it brings also
exist in the individual countries of the region. The lack of
trust and weak social capital that exist in many states,
such as Haiti, Trinidad, Jamaica and Guyana have some-
times has translated into a lack of confidence and support
for the state and its institutions. This might help to explain
the general pattern of remittances, which has tended to
be directed mainly at households and less through local
banking or government institutions. Additionally, many
Caribbean nationals have acquired wealth and prestige in
their host countries but have not been keen (or able) to
translate these into precise measures to aid the govern-
ments in their home countries directly. Income and social
inequalities, and a lack of trust between employers and
employees and between the state and its citizens, also
affect the diaspora’s relations with governments locally.
Such local and regional heterogeneity also exists within
the region’s diaspora communities, and remains one of
the challenges that must be overcome if this group is to
be effective in organization and planning, in both their
adopted and home countries. 
This scenario contrasts with that in Ireland, where the
society has been mainly homogenous (despite religious
differences). The social partnerships between the govern-
ment, unions and employers in Ireland have been useful
in maintaining some balance between wages in the various
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sectors, thus helping to reduce the disparities in income
and social class that tend to be more extreme in the
Caribbean (see Combat Poverty Agency, 2001; Taylor,
2002; and Ireland, 2005). While immigration has seen Irish
society becoming more stratified racially and socially, it
still has a level of homogeneity that is foreign to the
Caribbean.36 Coupled with these is a strong nationalism.
Collectively, these have helped to build a wealth of social
capital, trust and stability that has made development
planning and administration less erratic than in the
Caribbean – although some islands, such as Barbados,
contradict this rule. This strong nationalism in Ireland
also accounted for the desire of many in its diaspora to
return to or seek to invest in the country during the 1990s
and early 2000.
Brain Drain and the Diaspora
Both the Irish and the Caribbean diasporas have been a
source of innovation for governments, helping to introduce
efficiencies in the local economy. In both cases, although
the involvement of the diaspora beyond remittances has
not always been welcomed, measures have been intro-
duced to attract talented members of the diaspora to return,
given the need for their specific skills and talents. The
success of such measures in Ireland appears to outweigh
those adopted in the Caribbean. Rapid economic recovery
has been significant in attracting the diaspora to Ireland,
with returnees being drawn by the possibility of remu-
neration that is better than or at least similar to levels
realized in the host country. The opportunity to make a
direct contribution to national development has also
encouraged some members of the diaspora to return.
While the Irish experience gives clear support for argu-
ments about brain gain and brain circulation, there is less
evidence for this reasoning in the Caribbean. Even here,
the brain gain in Ireland has taken place within the context
of economic growth and development, which has further
attracted the diaspora to return. Following from this it
would appear that a similar period of regeneration would
need to occur in the Caribbean for its diaspora to return
in sufficient numbers and at appropriate times to make a
marked difference and contribution to the region’s growth.
As Parks (2004) suggests, despite the measures to stem
brain drain in the Caribbean, these merely “help ease
brain drain’s symptoms, they do nothing for the cause.
The best solutions for brain drain are economic recovery
and social development.” 
The Impact of Remittances
The impact of remittances in the Caribbean is reduced
inasmuch as they represent household income and thus
fuel private consumption; as such, they do not represent
capital flows to the islands.37 As de Vasconcelos (2005: 8)
notes, “remittances remain financial flows in search of
financial products.” The IADB’s solution also has reso-
nance here: “the focus for the future is the chance to bring
millions upon millions of transnational families into the
financial system where remittances can help effect funda-
mental change” (IADB, 2006: 14). Further strategies, such
as collective remittancing, might not work on a regional
level but might be more effective at the individual country
or community level. Thus, it remains for governments in
the region to encourage the use of financial institutions
such as banks and credit unions, as well as greater use of
and access to bank accounts and other financial services
in the home country. 
Diasporas and Return Migration
The experience of return migration in the Caribbean
diverges from that in Ireland in three major ways. First,
return migration in Ireland has taken place at more 
significant levels than that experienced in the Caribbean.
Second, it has taken place at a more recent juncture of the
nation’s history than in the Caribbean, where it has
occurred only gradually over the decades. Third, and
perhaps most important, the Irish diaspora has made a
greater contribution through investments and the use of
its expertise and knowledge to assist the country’s
growth than has been the case in the Caribbean. 
Another point bears mentioning here as well. Many of
the Caribbean diaspora who have returned have not done
so voluntarily, but have been deportees who committed
crimes in host countries and who return with few, if any,
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36 O’Sullivan, for instance, notes that, in Ireland, social inequalities have materialized
in the form of increased homelessness and poor living and working conditions for
immigrants (2003: 4345). Nevertheless, although the rapid development of the past
two decades has resulted in an increase in inequality and diversity in the country,
it still does not exist to the extent realized in Caribbean territories such as Guyana.
37 The extent to which this is also the case in Ireland is unclear. It may be that the
negative impact is mitigated by the more advanced and developed nature of Ireland’s
macroeconomy. Additionally, the absence of a significant balance of payments
deficit and high exports means that the effects of the importation of luxury goods,
which is a problem in the Caribbean, might not be as strong an issue in Ireland.
assets to contribute to national development. The potential
social dislocation from such deportations remains uncertain
but worrying for countries in the region. Some returnees
are also aged and retirees. This contrasts with Ireland,
where returnees, attracted by the opportunities at home,
are among the most educated and economically active,
and have returned with capital and knowledge to invest
in specific sectors of the economy identified as most in
need of labour. 
Diasporas, Governance and Legitimacy
The success of diasporas in host countries is also an
important determinant of the level of impact they make
in their country of origin. Whereas the Caribbean diaspora
has gained wealth and status in their adopted countries,
it has not matched that of the Irish diaspora. The ways in
which the two diasporas have wielded their influence
also differs. Thus, while members of the Irish diaspora
have been able to access the heights of political power in
the United States and to heighten the profile of their
country abroad, fewer of the Caribbean diaspora have
found themselves in such a position. Moreover, such impact
as they have had has been seen mainly at the community
level, and even when their influence has been felt beyond
this level, they have not had much success in elevating
Caribbean issues onto the political or policy agenda of
their adopted countries. There are, however, some excep-
tions. For instance, the Cuban diaspora in the United States
has been a powerful lobby group, whose activism has
helped challenge the legitimacy and authority of the Castro
regime. It has also placed pressure on investors wishing
to do business with Cuba. It may even be suggested that
the diaspora, to some extent, has had an adverse impact
on Cuba’s economic development, as seen in the embargo
imposed on that nation by the United States. 
The way the Irish government has engaged with its dias-
pora has evolved over the years, becoming more nuanced
in recent times, as seen in the gradual increase in financial
assistance to members of the diaspora as the Irish economy
has developed. Caribbean governments, however, may
not be in a position to wait for economic development
before they are able to extend meaningful assistance to
their diaspora beyond accepting deportees from host
countries. Nonetheless, a policy of welfare provision and
assistance to the diaspora would have to contend with
existing claims on meagre government budgets and the
sensibilities of local taxpayers. 
While migration allowed the legitimacy of the state to
remain intact in Ireland, this has not been as straightfor-
ward in the Caribbean. The reason for the difference
could be that, although the driving force behind migration,
for the most part, has been economic, there are also
political and security reasons for migration from some
Caribbean territories, as in the example of Cuba. Diaspora
creation thus becomes a forced event, potentially leading
to feelings of ill will toward the home government and its
institutions. In the end, the expression of nationalism
may differ based on the rationale for migration and the
sentiments of the diaspora. Thus, Irish nationalism and
home country support may have been expressed through
moves to link the country into the global IT network,
through investments and advocacy of improved economic
ties between host and home countries, through the number
of bank accounts held by expatriates and through the
return of many of the skilled, educated and wealthy.
Nationalism in some Caribbean territories, in contrast, is
characterized by low trust and may be seen in, for example,
an unwillingness to engage in activities that could be
construed as lending direct support to the state (such as
investments and the sending of funds through official
channels) and a preference to send remittances directly to
families. Further, the prospects of the home country may
be affected by the diaspora inasmuch as potential visitors
and investors are warded off by its criticisms, lobbying
and negative portrayal of the home government.
Incentives for Investment
Both diasporas have contributed to the economies of 
their home countries through investments and business 
creation, but the overall value of capital and skills 
contributed by the Irish diaspora is more significant than
that of the Caribbean.
Specific lessons from the Irish example stand out for the
Caribbean. First, the right incentives need to be in place
to encourage the diaspora to make investments at home.
Second, the areas in which incentives are offered should
be complimentary to the development objectives of the
region or individual. An essential plank of any incentive
regime is the ease of conducting business with the home
country, a point that is closely related to the nature of the
tax regime. In Ireland, there was a keen emphasis on
opening the economy, emphasizing skills and vocation in
the educational curriculum, simplifying the tax regime to
welcome investments and aiding its diaspora to make 
a greater contribution to the economy. Although good 
fortune cannot be denied, the benefits that have accrued to
Ireland since the 1980s have not come about in a willy-nilly
fashion; rather, they are the result of careful planning and
partnership involving the diaspora. These policies were
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implemented even though it was accepted that many of
the beneficiaries would depart. Caribbean nations are also
awakening to the need to encourage investment more
generally, and from the diaspora as a specific category 
of investors. As seen in the Irish case, however, the
importance of sound planning and political will cannot
be underestimated. 
Finally, Ireland’s moves to attract investment were not
necessarily geared specifically toward its diaspora. How-
ever, given the diaspora’s size, capacity and influence in
countries such as the United States, it was able to encour-
age the move of capital, expertise and labour to Ireland.
Ireland’s membership in the EU also provided added
motivation and incentive to modernize the economy and
administration, moves which were to make the country
more attractive to investors and place it in a position to
take advantage of private investment that eventually
came its way from the boom in the IT industry. The
Caribbean, on the other hand, may not necessarily have
the level of support or capacity in regional organizations
such as CARICOM, although there is recognition of the
need to attract international investors and to reduce the
cost of doing business in the region. Specific efforts to
increase investments have included tax shelters and a
host of incentives to specific industries (such as hotels
and manufacturing), but this remains a difficult task. 
The imperative for the Caribbean region is to increase the
conditions that would make foreigners want to invest
there. If that were the case, the diaspora would also be
more likely to exercise its nationalism and inclination to
invest, knowing that it would do so in a stable environ-
ment. There also remains a need to sensitize the diaspora
on the ways in which it can contribute to national and
regional development beyond remittancing and other
traditional areas of assistance (such as humanitarian aid),
or by maximizing or leveraging the impact of these forms
of contribution for more strategic growth and development.
Conclusion and Recommendations
This study has attempted to compare the impact of the
Irish diaspora on its home country’s development with
that of the Caribbean diaspora. An underlying principle
of this assessment is that a diaspora’s contribution does
not simply reflect its willingness or desire to contribute,
but also the role played by the home government in 
facilitating the diaspora’s involvement, as well as the
institutional and policy framework in the home country. 
Despite the differences between them, the Irish diaspora’s
experience holds some key lessons for that of the
Caribbean. For example, the return of many members of
the Irish diaspora has been linked to growth and devel-
opment in the home country, from which one can assume
that where there is no development and opportunities
remain few and far between, a diaspora might not be
eager to return to help in its home country’s development.
(It is less easy, however, to assess in the Irish case whether
it was the diaspora that instigated development or
whether members began to return only when they were
best able to aid development efforts.) The Irish case also
highlights the importance of national planning in estab-
lishing the environment and incentives for attracting
investment and other resources for development. Political
will and foresight as well as stability at home are also key
to driving the reforms needed to attract the support, trust
and confidence of investors and, in turn, the diaspora. In
Ireland’s case, these were essential in determining the
success of cooperation and the extent to which investors
were willing to take advantage of investment opportunities.
Moves toward streamlining remittances and investments
would be a positive step in this light. Likewise, moves by
individual governments within the Caribbean region
toward educating its diaspora about the ways in which it
can have a more profound effect on growth and develop-
ment at home is also important. Caribbean governments
thus must do more to maintain links with diaspora com-
munities, while addressing deep-seated issues regarding
trust and the credibility of government institutions and
organizations at home by, for example, strengthening
professional networks in the diaspora and heightening
linkages with government departments and ministries. 
It is important to note that Ireland has not always actively
sought out its diaspora and that engagement is still a
fairly recent event. For instance, although migrants in
Britain once faced harsh conditions and a lack of repre-
sentation, Irish governments in the post-independence
period tended not to visit Britain and were unaware 
of the plight of its diaspora. The result was that “Irish
immigrants in Britain increasingly appeared in Britain as
displaced people in a foreign country, without a voice 
or coherent identity” (O’Sullivan, 1994: 158). Today, the
experiences of the Caribbean diaspora mirror those of the
Irish diaspora in the early twentieth century. Although
most Caribbean territories have representatives in the form
of consulates and embassies in the developed nations
that host the majority of their emigrants, the conditions of
many migrants could be advanced by more advocacy
and assistance from home governments and agencies. 
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The Caribbean diaspora has played a vital role in its respec-
tive home countries, but its impact has been dispersed,
lacking in specific focus, direction or organization,
reflecting the lack of strategic focus and coordination
among regional governments and, in turn, within the
diaspora. The specific areas in which the diaspora can
contribute to national and regional development have yet
to be fully investigated by governments in the region. This
has meant that gains from the diaspora’s contribution are
not being fully realized. Thus, whereas in Ireland much
of the contribution in terms of investment has come in the
IT sector, this contribution is less specific in the Caribbean.
Thus, there is still much room for the activities of the
Caribbean diaspora to be better organized and scaled up
to have a more direct impact on growth and development.
The continuing growth and dependence on remittances
is, in some ways, indicative of the Caribbean region’s
continued inability to provide opportunities for its people.
Nevertheless, remittances do provide a stock of capital
that can be used above and beyond the level of individual
households to provide a means for more enduring eco-
nomic and social development. Here, governments and
banking institutions can play a role in raising awareness
among citizens at home and abroad about the ways in
which remittances can be used and harnessed.38 This
includes information on how remittances can be collec-
tivized and their impact scaled up, and advice on the
diverse ways in which remittances can be used directly by
the receiving families and households to raise themselves
out of poverty and sustained dependence on such funds. 
There is also a case for tailoring investment strategies and
options to match the different resource levels of the
Caribbean’s diaspora. The challenge remains for govern-
ments in the region to find ways to engineer this change.
Ireland offers some solution here. For instance, one lesson
that seems to be emerging is the importance of involving
diaspora investment in specific industries or sectors.
Focused effort and planning at the micro level can then
have a macro effect in as much as success in one area
encourages growth in related industries. This has been
the case with IT in Ireland, where investments in this area
were instrumental in driving the financial services sector.
In the Caribbean, the focus could be on creating opportu-
nities for investments in such sectors as education and
health, especially where there is insufficient desire, capital
or expertise to start a business.39 Thus, strategic and dedi-
cated planning and forecasting from government and
regional bodies such as CARICOM is essential in providing
a secure environment that will attract investors and
enable their investments to thrive.
Issues such as the cost and time required for conducting
business and the need for home governments to address
crime and violence should also factor into discussions
about incentives for the diaspora’s return and involvement
in national development. Host countries also have a role
to play in this regard, by helping the region to enhance its
capacity to deal with issues such as the return of deportees
and monitoring criminal networks. Likewise, the efficiency
and clarity of the tax system and customs process should
also come into play, perhaps involving the development
of a knowledge bank of returning residents and specific
programs (such as voluntary associations) to use their
skills in areas such as education and health. In addition,
SMEs could do more to tap into the diaspora as a point of
entry into the markets of developed countries. Here, the
diaspora could help to reduce transaction costs (par-
ticularly, costs of market entry) by providing an existing
market for exports from the home country; it could also
help to raise the profile of goods and services from the
home country, and act as a source for loans or investment
funding for local economies. 
The diaspora could also help focus the attention of home
governments on ways to achieve greater efficiencies in,
and the modernization of, government practices, particu-
larly given concerns about corruption and the misuse of
public funds in the region. Although the diaspora might
not be able to participate directly in the electoral process,
it nonetheless could help to monitor and assess govern-
ment activities to ensure adherence to principles of good
governance. Trust-building would be enhanced by events
such as diaspora conferences and the clear articulation by
Caribbean governments of their hopes and ambitions as
they relate to the diaspora and their engagement with it
to ascertain where alliances could be formed and joint
interests met. Such moves likely would also restore con-
fidence in, and the credibility of, the region’s political
leaders. Caribbean diaspora organizations already exist
in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom
and Canada; but, their impact on a political level is 
limited by their small size. The efforts of countries such
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38 Financial institutions such as the Jamaica National Building Society (JNBS) 
provide a model for such interaction. Over the years, JNBS has courted the trust
of the Jamaican diaspora and offered investment opportunities at home, including
real estate opportunities and loans.
39 Thomas-Hope (2004) makes a similar recommendation, calling on both financial
incentives and investment opportunities in welfare, education and health as a
means of increasing the benefits of remittances and the developmental impact of
such funds.
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as Jamaica and Haiti to provide a point of contact for
such groups through the creation of specific ministerial
portfolios is a positive step, but governments in both
home and host countries need to liaise with these groups
and map their activities. This could be a first step toward
uniting the various diaspora associations and encourag-
ing more internal dialogue, which could help them to
achieve a closer alignment of activities and aims and
more effective use of their resources and influence. 
The role of consulates and embassies in host countries is
also critical in building relationships between the home
countries and the diaspora. As such, the quality of care,
organization and visibility of overseas representatives are
important in the region’s bid to reach its diaspora. This
relates to the ability of consulates and embassies to
organize and leverage the power and resources of the
diaspora not only to aid development in home countries,
but also to encourage the diaspora’s political activism
and securing its rights in host countries. There is also a
need for more awareness within the diaspora of the role
and responsibilities of such representatives. 
Importantly, as the Irish case shows, education is crucial
in dictating a country’s preparedness to take advantage of
opportunities, even where the highly trained eventually
migrate. Although brain drain remains a pressing issue
for the Caribbean, the value of an educated population
will increase as immigration policies in the developed
world target the skilled and most qualified. Additionally,
an educated population potentially means more scope for
advancement on the part of migrants in the host country,
as in the case of the Irish. The timing of a diaspora’s
return, its willingness to contribute to the development of
the home country and the numbers, skills and resources
of returnees are key indicators of the level of contribution
that a diaspora can make to development. In the Irish
case, the emphasis was on achieving a balance between
educational needs as dictated by the expected direction
of the economy. Educated individuals who left the country
arguably were better placed to take advantage of oppor-
tunities in the host country and, in so doing, to acquire
the capacity to make a contribution to Ireland. For those
who remained, education gave them the skills necessary
to work in industries such as pharmaceuticals and IT.
Thus, a key point that emerges from this analysis is 
the importance of planning and forecasting skills and
educational needs in the Caribbean region. This might
require a more proactive approach in monitoring the
global environment to detect trends and emerging ideas,
and assessing and modifying these where necessary to
suit national imperatives. 
The region, in short, must come to terms with migration
as a feature of Caribbean life. As such, emphasis should
be placed on training and educating its peoples so that
they are better placed to be a factor of influence in their
adopted countries. Although there are inherent dangers
in developing skills solely to match the needs of 
the developed world (in health-related occupations, for
instance), there is some merit in home country govern-
ments’ considering what skills they could most benefit
from developing, particularly where migration is already
prevalent. Asian countries such as China, India and 
Vietnam have benefited immensely from such focus. 
Additionally, the role of tourism should be highlighted.
In the case of Ireland, the tourism market was encouraged
by reduced travel costs, as well as the interest of second-
and third-generation Irish in experiencing the culture of
their parents and ancestors. In the Caribbean, however,
the cost and difficulty of travel remains a challenge to the
growth of diaspora tourism and more generally to the
development of the overall tourism market. As such, the
region could benefit from joint arrangements that could
help reduce the cost of internal travel while encouraging
the diaspora (and other tourists) to travel more freely
throughout the region and, in so doing, to encourage
diversification into the diaspora tourism market. Further,
governments in conjunction with tourism organisations
could target the diaspora more directly through media
campaigns in much the same way as the islands target
tourists in the US and European markets. The region’s
rich and diverse history and culture could be marketed in
the diaspora, which, in turn, could assist in marketing the
region and its culture in host countries.
Overall, the Irish example illustrates the importance of
moving toward a more symbiotic relationship between
the diaspora and the home country. Likewise, the diaspora
has a key role to play in voicing home countries’ concerns
and interests in host countries. In the end, the emphasis
should remain on sound developmental planning, which
remittances cannot replace. The diaspora can play a crucial
role in national developmental planning where policies
exist to involve it effectively in the process. Thus, whereas
the Irish had the benefit of EU funding and a diaspora
that was well resourced, both politically and financially,
the Caribbean does not have these advantages. As such,
the region might need to base its activities more closely
on informed and credible planning and management of the
development agenda, and on appeals to the philanthropy
and goodwill that already exists among its diaspora.
There is also need for more collaboration and coordination
among the diaspora; much of this is up to the region’s
governments, but it also depends on the commitment
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and efforts of the diaspora itself. There remains a need for
more strategic cooperation, issue identification and goal
setting within the diaspora to translate goodwill into 
tangible and meaningful objectives in both home and
host countries. 
Finally, while the Irish experience holds many lessons for
the Caribbean, perhaps the largest relates to the economic
development. That is, although developmental strategies
and solutions must be guided and informed by global
trends and best practices, these must be conditioned 
by careful policy design and analysis at home, and be
cognisant of the particular dynamics of the islands and
the region as a whole.
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